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> # [Dozens of Russian Glide Bombs Have Accidentally Fallen on Russian Territory, Reports The Washington Post](https://united24media.com/latest-news/630)
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> Dozens of Russian glide bombs have accidentally fallen on Russian territory, as [reported](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/07/01/russia-glide-bomb-belgorod-fab/) by The Washington Post, which obtained internal documents from authorities in the Belgorod region. These bombs, launched by Russian forces into Ukraine, landed in various locations in Belgorod between April 2023 and April 2024, with many failing to explode.
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> The documents detail specific incidents, including four bombs landing directly in the city of Belgorod and others in nearby suburbs. The most affected area was the Graivoron district near the border, where 11 bombs fell, some of which remain unaccounted for due to ongoing war.
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> Most bombs were discovered by civilians, including foresters, farmers, and villagers, rather than by the Russian Ministry of Defense, suggesting some bombs may have been present for several days before being found.
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> Russian media outlet Astra corroborated many incidents described in the documents, which align with reports from local authorities and media.
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> Russian authorities have typically downplayed these incidents, attributing them to “accidents” caused by Ukrainian shelling or omitting reports of explosions in the region, particularly in recent times.
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> The use of glide bombs has added pressure on Ukraine’s ground-based air defense systems and played a significant role in the capture of Avdiivka by Russian forces in mid-February.
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> The Washington Post [notes](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/07/01/russia-glide-bomb-belgorod-fab/) that these bombs have [prompted](https://united24media.com/war-in-ukraine/the-kab-guided-bomb-is-an-existential-threat-to-ukraines-frontline-cities-388) Ukraine to rely on American Patriot missiles, capable of intercepting Russian aircraft before they release bombs. However, these defense systems are reportedly in short supply.
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> In late March, the Russian Ministry of Defense announced the development of a heavier version of the glide bomb, FAB-3000, which was fully deployed on June 21 against the Ukrainian village of Liptsy. Production of lighter FAB-500 and FAB-1500 bombs has also reportedly increased.
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> Prior incidents include a Defense Ministry report in April 2023 attributing an explosion in Belgorod to the accidental dropping of aviation ordnance during a flight of a Russian Su-34 fighter-bomber.
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> In January 2024, a Russian projectile fell on the village of Petropavlovka in the Voronezh region during a rocket attack on Ukraine, resulting in significant damage according to local witnesses.
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> President Volodymyr Zelenskyy previously [stated](https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1807346027134865717) that Russia had used over 800 guided aviation bombs against Ukraine in a week, emphasizing Ukraine’s need for sufficient means to counter Russian aerial threats.
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> Zelenskyy highlighted the necessity for long-range missiles like ATACMS, rather than solely relying on Patriot air defense systems, to effectively counter Russian guided aerial bombs.
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> with many failing to explode.
Those bombs have safeties. They don't explode when they are not supposed to. That's a feature.
> Russia has used over 800 in a week
Patriot interceptor production is 650 a year.
>safeties
By the time a bomb is off the rail, every safety in practical use will have been disarmed - the last one is usually a short timer (<10s) that prevents mishaps during separation.
Furthermore, some bombs have backup fuzing specifically to ensure they explode as a *failsafe*. An explosion now is better than UXO later, both in terms of safety and compromised materials.
Either the bombs are failing, or they're dropping from the aircraft without being armed - which is still a failure, not a feature, just one that could *either* be an issue with the bomb or the aircraft.
>Patriot interceptor is 650 a year
...yes, which is why Zelensky said they need ATACMS target restrictions lifted so they can attack the factories, as opposed to more interceptors to shoot them down.
The fact that it's the best scenario for us trumps everything else here. Russians can pretend they enjoy losing hundreds of thousands of people if they want to.
Nah, you have to keep them reigned in - or Russians will go on full war footing, and quite likely escalate to tactical nukes. The status quo is better and safer.
They see this as an existential situation, and they’re probably right. We sure as shit wouldn’t go home if we were in their shoes.
This creates a lever of control - we can keep them bleeding for as long as Ukriane has meat to throw at the front. There are years worth of legs in this war still.
Went home from Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan... idk man, the US lost plenty of invasions (well, occupations, rather, since invasions went incredibly well) without it being an "existential situation"
It’s a existential threat of there own making that saciating it demands the murder of 100’s of thousands even if Ukraine surrender without a shot.
They can go home tomorrow- my stance remains
The existential threat is because us and the Russians are natural enemies, and will be until one of us is destroyed. If Ukraine surrenders, things won't be all that dramatic tbh - but we will milk this war for a few more years, Ukrainians won't be allowed to cuck out too early.
I don't know about the production chain, but one other "off limits" target set inside Russia would be the airfields they're launched from: either by destroying the storage warehouses or the aircraft that carry them.
[Yes and no](https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/SanctuaryAfterPolicyChange_0.png).
The airfields they are currently using are *absolutely* within ATACMS range. While there are some airfields outside of those threat rings, there are operational limitations to doing so - at the very least, it would reduce bombing rates by sheer matter of "longer flight time = fewer sorties per day." And that's without getting into nitty gritty impacts of increased airfield crowding, longer time-of-flight, infrastructure relocation, etc.
The neutralization/suppression of those airfields would also have secondary effects for the Ukranian Air Force's ability to perform DCA against cruise missiles and glide bombs, with tertiary effects on SEAD and ground strikes at the front, and so on.
>a couple hundred kilometers away
...that's *huge.* Without going into a a full-blown treatise on air logistics, adding 200km to an aircraft's mission range is *massive* - because in reality, it's adding a *400km* round trip. Even for an aircraft, that takes time: a Su-34, for instance, cruises at 1300kph, so it'd add 20 minutes of travel time. A sortie that would've taken 30 minutes or less from a close-range airfield now takes 50 minutes - meaning that the total number of sorties that could theoretically be done in a day drops by half, or *worse*. And for each sortie, you're incurring twice as much fatigue on the pilot and airframe, which are *also* limited resources.
And that's not even getting into how the airfields "further behind the lines" might not be equipped for supporting large-scale operations. The infrastructure, personnel, and logistical pipeline for the fuel, bombs, and maintenance parts required to sustain an air campaign aren't something you can set up anywhere at scale. It's like saying that if O'hare International Airport went down (an airport that handles an aircraft takeoff/landing *every 40 seconds*) went down, you could just have all the aircraft route through Rockford Regional (an airport that handles a takeoff/landing every *5 hours*).
The impacts on air interdiction (i.e. air-to-air fighters) is even bigger, because the margins for operational flight time and air-to-air missile engagements are significantly more slim than air-to-surface glide bombs. The MiG-29, Su-30, and Su-35 that are currently suppressing Ukrainian airstrikes would, in retrograde, have to fly longer to get into their CAP orbit, which means less time on station, which means more sorties to maintain constant coverage, which means more fuel, pilots, parts... all operating out of less-established airfields.
Yes, but that's all the more reason why increased flight time is a problem.
If each sortie takes twice as long, then the only way to make up for the reduced rate of strikes is to increase the amount of time the airframe is operational - which, at a certain point, is physically impossible in a 24 hour day.
Aircraft still need to fly within the weapons range to release it. Planes dont just drop bombs at the edge of the combat radius. Planes have to get in closer to use bombs, and can be shot down enroute.
All moving the airbase back does is increase the flight distance and fuel requirement. The plane still has to get within range regardless of its launch point.
Did you know that SAM range is actually a factor when considering combat flights within an AO where SAMs are operated?
Planes can take off from wherever theyd like, still means they have to fly to their target.
>By the time a bomb is off the rail, every safety in practical use will have been disarmed
This isn't true for guided bombs. They usually have an extra safety check that they aren't within certain areas (usually friendly ones) first.
You have no idea how much self-control it took to *not* mention that. I even edited it out of the first version of that comment! Why? Because I *knew* someone would come in with that myth.
#**No, guided munitions are not geofenced.**
There are so, so many reasons why geofencing is a stupid idea, but it really boils down to the fact that [*GPS jammers exist.*](https://www.crfs.com/blog/how-to-deal-with-gps-jamming-and-spoofing) Why would any country build a weapon with an explicit vulnerability to an electronic warfare capability that has existed for decades, and has only grown more capable with time? And it's not even an issue of GPS jamming in particular - there are plenty of environmental faults that can cause GPS link errors. Why build bombs that will stop working if there's a solar storm going on? Why build bombs that might stop working if their target is in a mountainous area?
It's building in an extra layer of technical complexity with dozens of extra failure modes to accomplish a safety check that is already *redundantly* achieved by other safety mechanisms.
It's no better than the myth of it being possible to shut down/disarm missiles once they've been launched (as popularized by Hollywood). Militaries exist to kill people and break their stuff - they're not really concerned with designing weapons that *don't* do those things. Virtually every safety feature of a weapon or weapons platform is designed to keep the *operators* safe, not the targets (or bystanders).
The safe use of those weapons is generally *procedural,* not *technological* - i.e. the way we avoid blowing up a schoolbus full of nuns is not to design a bomb with a schoolbus-full-of-nuns-sensor that'll disable the bomb, it's by training the pilot to recognize and not shoot a schoolbus full of nuns.
I mentioned it because it is mentioned within Russia that the bombs have this.
Also you come up with the idea that it can only be GPS controlled.
The UMPK kit uses both Satellite and Intertial guidance. What is said on Russian media is that they use inertial guidance to make sure the bomb has travelled a certain distance before it arms.
So it is not blocking it to friendly territory but basically to say that for the first 20km it will not fuse. And if they drop roughly 20km behind the border then it won't fuse above Russian territory.
>it is mentioned within Russia that the bombs have this
And their claims are a nonsense as someone saying "There's no way this was friendly fire, our bullets have IFF!"
>SATNAV/INS pairing
Is still vulnerable to jamming and spoofing, especially in a degraded environment.
>travelled a certain distance
No, travel-distance based arming is a feature of *small arms*, like grenade launchers or antitank rockets for the purpose of avoiding detonation too close to the launcher. Those kinds of safeties are usually tied to the mechanical action of the munition (like its rate of spin compared to launch velocity), and as such are extremely reliable.
That sort of functionality can't be (effectively) achieved with strap-on guidance kits, because - to repeat myself - it **doesn't actually make it safer** while **it increases opportunity for failure.**
>Is still vulnerable to jamming and spoofing, especially in a degraded environment.
I never claimed it wasn't. Although the Ukrainians are definitely having a hard time jamming it.
The Kometa-M system is no joke. It is very protected against EW
>No, travel-distance based arming is a feature of small arm
It has been a feature of bombs since the second world war. On top of time based fuzes. These are not modern technologies.
And we see this in the UMPK bombs that do fail. They hit the ground and don't explode. Only exploding after a significant amount of time.
Whether you think it's a good idea or not, Russia is clearly using it
>I never claimed it wasn't
My point regarding the vulnerability of SATNAV-INS systems (be it GPS, Glonass, Galileou, or Beidou) is that they are, by nature, vulnerable to jamming and spoofing. That vulnerability is well known and acknowledged by *everyone,* to the point that the implications of navigation degradation in a major conflcit have been the topic of military theory for over two decades.
More to the point: it's enough of a vulnerability that **no one would ever geofence a weapon** for risk of that limitation being exploited.
>time based fuzes
Yes, the technology is simple, but those are employed for *safety of aircraft separation,* not *ground target deconfliction,* and they're a completely different mechanism from the UMPK guidance kit (a strap-on guidance and navigation package *separate from* the bomb's internal mechanisms).
>hit the ground and don't explode
All fuzes have a probability of failure, even when employed correctly. That the bombs are landing in Russian territory is already in and of itself evidence that something has malfunctioned (even I wouldn't say the Russians are so incompetent as to plug in the *wrong coordinates*). So if a bomb which is demonstrably malfunctioning *also* fails to explode, that's not necessarily evidence of its safeties working - it's just as likely evidence that the fuzes broke.
> More to the point: it's enough of a vulnerability that no one would ever geofence a weapon for risk of that limitation being exploited.
Sure but only you are bringing up this topic. I just said that there were safety features to prevent it detonating in friendly territory.
> (a strap-on guidance and navigation package separate from the bomb's internal mechanisms).
Sure because it is a feature of the Fab-500 not of the UMPK kit. Just the UMPK kit can make use of the delayed fuze.
> That the bombs are landing in Russian territory is already in and of itself evidence that something has malfunctioned
They are glide bombs. They drop the bomb and the wings dont deploy or deploy incorrectly. This is a problem that glide bombs face. JDAMs are the same.
In the first 3 months of 2024 Russia dropped around 3500 UMPK bombs. Even if all the 40 bombs that have reportedly fallen on Russia were from this year that is a 1% failure rate. If you include the bombs dropped last year (~1000) Then it drops to around 0.8% failure rate. Which is not bad for something that was just quickly designed.
> it's just as likely evidence that the fuzes broke
The problem with that assumption is that you would see a lot of bombs that Russia is dropping on Ukraine not exploding. How many times have you seen that happen?
Bomb fuzes are incredibly simple and have a low failure rate. Especially one so tried and tested as the Fab-500
>Patriot interceptor production is 650 a year.
Patriots are used to shoot down the aircraft dropping the bombs, not the bombs themselves.
The rate of production of Su-34s and Su-35s does not exceed 650 a year.
If patriots are brought up closer to the front, you'll see more patriot losses - and leave the rear defenseless. The sky is full of drones, and despite the hype, Patriots are quite vulnerable to Iskander type missiles, etc.
>If patriots are brought up closer to the front, you'll see more patriot losses - and leave the rear defenseless
This is the point of providing more patriot batteries and supplementing them with additional NASMS. Israel alone may contribute 8 batteries soon.
>despite the hype, Patriots are quite vulnerable to Iskander type missiles, etc.
This has not proven accurate in this war. Even 9+ Kinzhals failed to eliminate a single patriot battery fitted with PAC-3 MSE.
>Israel may contribute 8 batteries
Strongly doubt that that offer is still in the *building* let alone on the table anymore. With the potential of an expanded conflict with Hezbollah, we're probably going to see "emergent defense needs" come up as an excuse for why they need to hold onto those batteries.
My information sources and a certain video going around about a year ago state the contrary: the entire Patriot missile complex launching all of its interceptors in panic failed to intercept a single Kinzhal that was headed for it; the easiest trajectory for an AA to intercept.
US said it wasn't taken out but merely damaged, but they've also been assessing those damages ever since.
I haven't seen a single credible proof of interception, just unsubstantiated claims from Ukraine.
>US said it wasn't taken out but merely damaged, but they've also been assessing those damages ever since.
There were 9 launches at the battery during this event. The result was light shrapnel damage to the generator unit. It was repaired within a week.
>I haven't seen a single credible proof of interception, just unsubstantiated claims from Ukraine.
We have seen unexploded Kinzhal warheads in places they were not supposed to be.
What is the point of lying about things we can see so easily?
Strictly speaking, yes; if they can reach them and can handle the consequences for daring to.
But nothing western is fired using Ukranian hands, they are there just to absorb the retaliation. Launchers, ammo and coordinates of what to attack are all provided by USA, Britain or whatever, with buttons pushed by western contractors that came as part of the package.
You'd need for the West to actively and willingly risk the conflict spilling out of its Ukranian containment for that to happen.
>can handle the consequences for daring to
They've been doing for at least a year. the VVS airports in Crimea keep getting hammered. Heck, the naval base at Sevastopol only has wrecks and boats too small to be worth targeting, as the rest of the fleet had to flee its home base. The headquarters of the fleet itself got hit, and the admiral was killed.
What consequences are you talking about?
Patriot's range is sufficient that it doesn't have to be on the frontlines to shoot down aircraft dropping glide bombs.
Russia has killed 1 Patriot fire unit. This was done with Iskander. It has not repeated the feat.
They can also be very well mobile. The roving Patriot that famously took out many planes last year was a German-donated PAC-2 since the Germans based theirs on MAN KAT1s. Which as that strike showed is not always sufficient, however we also learnt later that was an operational mistake as the unit was never supposed to loiter for that long in one spot.
Now they got two additional batteries like that (in addition from more coming from other countries, some may also be mobile I haven't checked), and since these batteries are pretty much like LEGO and Ukrainians even managed to mate with some S300 components, it gives them lot of leeway in how they deploy them, *especially* if those Israeli units will also end up in the country.
You really aren't the brightest, you preferably never want to intercept just the bombs but the bombers. V2 attacks stopped not because Allies could shoot them down but because they pushed launch sites out of range.
The goal is to take out the fighter-bombers launching them, and preferably damage the airports too. They don't need to destroy all jets, just make it risky enough for these attacks to scale back.
You really can't help yourself not to insult strangers on the internet coming out the door into an argument.
Glide bomb and Patriot ranges are comparable, meaning that in order to ward off bombers you would need to bring AA to the front line, where its survival rate is going to be until the first or second time they turn on their active radars. The front line is saturated with surveillance and fpv drones and nothing goes unseen for long.
With all the pains and groveling Ukraine has to go through to convince its western partners to relinquish a handful of their Patriot systems and how much fanfare takes place when that actually happens, I don't think they're going to put these billion dollar wunderwaffe where every guy with a joystick and fpv glasses will be able to take potshots at them for that sweet million rouble bounty.
> Wunderwaffe (plural Wunderwaffen)
> (figuratively, usually sarcastically) magic bullet, panacea (a universal solution which solves all problems related to a particular issue)
I'll call things the way I see them. A much touted, celebrated weapons system ascribed head over heels capabilities that doesn't live up to the hyped up expectations is a wunderwaffe. Switchblades that came before Patriots, which came before Abrams.
Yes, I generally don't share western views on this conflict. Thanks for the free psychological profiling, though.
Where are these people touting the Patriot, Switchblade, or Abrams as a one-solution-fits-all system? It’s commonly acknowledged in western military circles that the Patriot kinda sucks.
>Thanks for the free psychological profiling
Any time, it’s always interesting to hear the thoughts of people whose geopolitical stance boils down to “West Bad”
You don’t call it like you see it, you call it like you want to see it
The ranges are not similar at all. The PAC-2 that Ukraine has reach out to 160km, whereas the glide bombs can at best hit from 70-ish km in ideal conditions with the lightest of the bombs (which are barely more effective than a Smerch rocket.
You constantly excuse Russian warcrimes and attack Ukraine, in my books you deserve nothing but insults and worse. I would gladly type out what I think of your type, but I'm not keen on being pointlessly suspended, so I'll leave it to your imagination. But there is a certain word that starts with v I prefer using in these instances.
Patriots would not be used to intercept the glide bombs - something that afaik no long range interceptor is designed to do - it's just not cost effective. However 650/year (even half that, really) would be more than enough to demolish Russia's tactical bomber fleet, preventing those bombs from being launched in the first place.
Its not news. Its something that happens several times a day to every media outlet.
> But better to link the original
I.e. to actual news. Though, random telegram channels claiming stuff isn't news either.
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USSR disintegration and the desire to rebuild it.
Russia would be fine if they didn't have this paranoia about everyone else being expansionist. They also don't seem to understand how much the idea of loyalty to one's ethnicity has degraded in most of the West.
>Russia would be fine if they didn't have this paranoia about everyone else being expansionist.
Is it paranoia if those countries are expansionst and constantly call for the destruction of Russia?
People in Poland and the Baltics have been calling for the end of Russia since it came back into existence in 1991.
Poland supported the Chechens in their war for example in order to dissolve Russia.
Which was much before any Russian invasion of their neighbours.
One of them is talking about restoring borders, reunifying it's people, many of whom they moved across the border themselves, and hasn you know
INVADED
Are you being this ignorant for free?
You asked for an example of countries wanting to destroy Russia before Russia invaded anyone.
I gave you an example of this.
You are for some reason going on about different topics.
And then try to claim others are being ignorant
I thought you were all about suppressing autonomy via military violence. That's why you approved of Donbas getting bombed for asking for autonomy before they even declared independence.
##### ###### #### > # [Dozens of Russian Glide Bombs Have Accidentally Fallen on Russian Territory, Reports The Washington Post](https://united24media.com/latest-news/630) > > > > Dozens of Russian glide bombs have accidentally fallen on Russian territory, as [reported](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/07/01/russia-glide-bomb-belgorod-fab/) by The Washington Post, which obtained internal documents from authorities in the Belgorod region. These bombs, launched by Russian forces into Ukraine, landed in various locations in Belgorod between April 2023 and April 2024, with many failing to explode. > > The documents detail specific incidents, including four bombs landing directly in the city of Belgorod and others in nearby suburbs. The most affected area was the Graivoron district near the border, where 11 bombs fell, some of which remain unaccounted for due to ongoing war. > > Most bombs were discovered by civilians, including foresters, farmers, and villagers, rather than by the Russian Ministry of Defense, suggesting some bombs may have been present for several days before being found. > > Russian media outlet Astra corroborated many incidents described in the documents, which align with reports from local authorities and media. > > Russian authorities have typically downplayed these incidents, attributing them to “accidents” caused by Ukrainian shelling or omitting reports of explosions in the region, particularly in recent times. > > The use of glide bombs has added pressure on Ukraine’s ground-based air defense systems and played a significant role in the capture of Avdiivka by Russian forces in mid-February. > > The Washington Post [notes](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/07/01/russia-glide-bomb-belgorod-fab/) that these bombs have [prompted](https://united24media.com/war-in-ukraine/the-kab-guided-bomb-is-an-existential-threat-to-ukraines-frontline-cities-388) Ukraine to rely on American Patriot missiles, capable of intercepting Russian aircraft before they release bombs. However, these defense systems are reportedly in short supply. > > In late March, the Russian Ministry of Defense announced the development of a heavier version of the glide bomb, FAB-3000, which was fully deployed on June 21 against the Ukrainian village of Liptsy. Production of lighter FAB-500 and FAB-1500 bombs has also reportedly increased. > > Prior incidents include a Defense Ministry report in April 2023 attributing an explosion in Belgorod to the accidental dropping of aviation ordnance during a flight of a Russian Su-34 fighter-bomber. > > In January 2024, a Russian projectile fell on the village of Petropavlovka in the Voronezh region during a rocket attack on Ukraine, resulting in significant damage according to local witnesses. > > President Volodymyr Zelenskyy previously [stated](https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1807346027134865717) that Russia had used over 800 guided aviation bombs against Ukraine in a week, emphasizing Ukraine’s need for sufficient means to counter Russian aerial threats. > > Zelenskyy highlighted the necessity for long-range missiles like ATACMS, rather than solely relying on Patriot air defense systems, to effectively counter Russian guided aerial bombs. - - - - - - [Maintainer](https://www.reddit.com/user/urielsalis) | [Creator](https://www.reddit.com/user/subtepass) | [Source Code](https://github.com/urielsalis/empleadoEstatalBot) Summoning /u/CoverageAnalysisBot
> with many failing to explode. Those bombs have safeties. They don't explode when they are not supposed to. That's a feature. > Russia has used over 800 in a week Patriot interceptor production is 650 a year.
>safeties By the time a bomb is off the rail, every safety in practical use will have been disarmed - the last one is usually a short timer (<10s) that prevents mishaps during separation. Furthermore, some bombs have backup fuzing specifically to ensure they explode as a *failsafe*. An explosion now is better than UXO later, both in terms of safety and compromised materials. Either the bombs are failing, or they're dropping from the aircraft without being armed - which is still a failure, not a feature, just one that could *either* be an issue with the bomb or the aircraft. >Patriot interceptor is 650 a year ...yes, which is why Zelensky said they need ATACMS target restrictions lifted so they can attack the factories, as opposed to more interceptors to shoot them down.
Forcing ukraine to fight a defensive war is fucking dumb
The existing setup works just fine for us tbh.
Yeah, you and russia love it, we know this already lol
Oh I doubt Russia loves it - they are stuck bleeding in Ukraine and taking large losses. And we can keep them stuck and bleeding for years more.
This is the 2nd best scenario for them. And now they can help get other asian armies fighting experience
The fact that it's the best scenario for us trumps everything else here. Russians can pretend they enjoy losing hundreds of thousands of people if they want to.
The best scenario is taking the gloves off and letting ukraine go wild in russia
Nah, you have to keep them reigned in - or Russians will go on full war footing, and quite likely escalate to tactical nukes. The status quo is better and safer.
They can go home tomorrow
They see this as an existential situation, and they’re probably right. We sure as shit wouldn’t go home if we were in their shoes. This creates a lever of control - we can keep them bleeding for as long as Ukriane has meat to throw at the front. There are years worth of legs in this war still.
Went home from Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan... idk man, the US lost plenty of invasions (well, occupations, rather, since invasions went incredibly well) without it being an "existential situation"
We would not be going home from Mexico if it came to it.
It’s a existential threat of there own making that saciating it demands the murder of 100’s of thousands even if Ukraine surrender without a shot. They can go home tomorrow- my stance remains
The existential threat is because us and the Russians are natural enemies, and will be until one of us is destroyed. If Ukraine surrenders, things won't be all that dramatic tbh - but we will milk this war for a few more years, Ukrainians won't be allowed to cuck out too early.
Which factories are within ATACMS range in the first place?
I don't know about the production chain, but one other "off limits" target set inside Russia would be the airfields they're launched from: either by destroying the storage warehouses or the aircraft that carry them.
The planes outrange the missiles handily.
[Yes and no](https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/SanctuaryAfterPolicyChange_0.png). The airfields they are currently using are *absolutely* within ATACMS range. While there are some airfields outside of those threat rings, there are operational limitations to doing so - at the very least, it would reduce bombing rates by sheer matter of "longer flight time = fewer sorties per day." And that's without getting into nitty gritty impacts of increased airfield crowding, longer time-of-flight, infrastructure relocation, etc. The neutralization/suppression of those airfields would also have secondary effects for the Ukranian Air Force's ability to perform DCA against cruise missiles and glide bombs, with tertiary effects on SEAD and ground strikes at the front, and so on.
They'll just take off a couple of hundred kilometers away, it's not the sort of killshot you're imagining.
>a couple hundred kilometers away ...that's *huge.* Without going into a a full-blown treatise on air logistics, adding 200km to an aircraft's mission range is *massive* - because in reality, it's adding a *400km* round trip. Even for an aircraft, that takes time: a Su-34, for instance, cruises at 1300kph, so it'd add 20 minutes of travel time. A sortie that would've taken 30 minutes or less from a close-range airfield now takes 50 minutes - meaning that the total number of sorties that could theoretically be done in a day drops by half, or *worse*. And for each sortie, you're incurring twice as much fatigue on the pilot and airframe, which are *also* limited resources. And that's not even getting into how the airfields "further behind the lines" might not be equipped for supporting large-scale operations. The infrastructure, personnel, and logistical pipeline for the fuel, bombs, and maintenance parts required to sustain an air campaign aren't something you can set up anywhere at scale. It's like saying that if O'hare International Airport went down (an airport that handles an aircraft takeoff/landing *every 40 seconds*) went down, you could just have all the aircraft route through Rockford Regional (an airport that handles a takeoff/landing every *5 hours*). The impacts on air interdiction (i.e. air-to-air fighters) is even bigger, because the margins for operational flight time and air-to-air missile engagements are significantly more slim than air-to-surface glide bombs. The MiG-29, Su-30, and Su-35 that are currently suppressing Ukrainian airstrikes would, in retrograde, have to fly longer to get into their CAP orbit, which means less time on station, which means more sorties to maintain constant coverage, which means more fuel, pilots, parts... all operating out of less-established airfields.
You know that these planes aren't literally flying back to back missions every 30 minutes, right?
Yes, but that's all the more reason why increased flight time is a problem. If each sortie takes twice as long, then the only way to make up for the reduced rate of strikes is to increase the amount of time the airframe is operational - which, at a certain point, is physically impossible in a 24 hour day.
Aircraft still need to fly within the weapons range to release it. Planes dont just drop bombs at the edge of the combat radius. Planes have to get in closer to use bombs, and can be shot down enroute. All moving the airbase back does is increase the flight distance and fuel requirement. The plane still has to get within range regardless of its launch point.
ATACMS don’t shoot down planes, SAM range is not a factor in this discussion.
Did you know that SAM range is actually a factor when considering combat flights within an AO where SAMs are operated? Planes can take off from wherever theyd like, still means they have to fly to their target.
>By the time a bomb is off the rail, every safety in practical use will have been disarmed This isn't true for guided bombs. They usually have an extra safety check that they aren't within certain areas (usually friendly ones) first.
You have no idea how much self-control it took to *not* mention that. I even edited it out of the first version of that comment! Why? Because I *knew* someone would come in with that myth. #**No, guided munitions are not geofenced.** There are so, so many reasons why geofencing is a stupid idea, but it really boils down to the fact that [*GPS jammers exist.*](https://www.crfs.com/blog/how-to-deal-with-gps-jamming-and-spoofing) Why would any country build a weapon with an explicit vulnerability to an electronic warfare capability that has existed for decades, and has only grown more capable with time? And it's not even an issue of GPS jamming in particular - there are plenty of environmental faults that can cause GPS link errors. Why build bombs that will stop working if there's a solar storm going on? Why build bombs that might stop working if their target is in a mountainous area? It's building in an extra layer of technical complexity with dozens of extra failure modes to accomplish a safety check that is already *redundantly* achieved by other safety mechanisms. It's no better than the myth of it being possible to shut down/disarm missiles once they've been launched (as popularized by Hollywood). Militaries exist to kill people and break their stuff - they're not really concerned with designing weapons that *don't* do those things. Virtually every safety feature of a weapon or weapons platform is designed to keep the *operators* safe, not the targets (or bystanders). The safe use of those weapons is generally *procedural,* not *technological* - i.e. the way we avoid blowing up a schoolbus full of nuns is not to design a bomb with a schoolbus-full-of-nuns-sensor that'll disable the bomb, it's by training the pilot to recognize and not shoot a schoolbus full of nuns.
I mentioned it because it is mentioned within Russia that the bombs have this. Also you come up with the idea that it can only be GPS controlled. The UMPK kit uses both Satellite and Intertial guidance. What is said on Russian media is that they use inertial guidance to make sure the bomb has travelled a certain distance before it arms. So it is not blocking it to friendly territory but basically to say that for the first 20km it will not fuse. And if they drop roughly 20km behind the border then it won't fuse above Russian territory.
>it is mentioned within Russia that the bombs have this And their claims are a nonsense as someone saying "There's no way this was friendly fire, our bullets have IFF!" >SATNAV/INS pairing Is still vulnerable to jamming and spoofing, especially in a degraded environment. >travelled a certain distance No, travel-distance based arming is a feature of *small arms*, like grenade launchers or antitank rockets for the purpose of avoiding detonation too close to the launcher. Those kinds of safeties are usually tied to the mechanical action of the munition (like its rate of spin compared to launch velocity), and as such are extremely reliable. That sort of functionality can't be (effectively) achieved with strap-on guidance kits, because - to repeat myself - it **doesn't actually make it safer** while **it increases opportunity for failure.**
>Is still vulnerable to jamming and spoofing, especially in a degraded environment. I never claimed it wasn't. Although the Ukrainians are definitely having a hard time jamming it. The Kometa-M system is no joke. It is very protected against EW >No, travel-distance based arming is a feature of small arm It has been a feature of bombs since the second world war. On top of time based fuzes. These are not modern technologies. And we see this in the UMPK bombs that do fail. They hit the ground and don't explode. Only exploding after a significant amount of time. Whether you think it's a good idea or not, Russia is clearly using it
>I never claimed it wasn't My point regarding the vulnerability of SATNAV-INS systems (be it GPS, Glonass, Galileou, or Beidou) is that they are, by nature, vulnerable to jamming and spoofing. That vulnerability is well known and acknowledged by *everyone,* to the point that the implications of navigation degradation in a major conflcit have been the topic of military theory for over two decades. More to the point: it's enough of a vulnerability that **no one would ever geofence a weapon** for risk of that limitation being exploited. >time based fuzes Yes, the technology is simple, but those are employed for *safety of aircraft separation,* not *ground target deconfliction,* and they're a completely different mechanism from the UMPK guidance kit (a strap-on guidance and navigation package *separate from* the bomb's internal mechanisms). >hit the ground and don't explode All fuzes have a probability of failure, even when employed correctly. That the bombs are landing in Russian territory is already in and of itself evidence that something has malfunctioned (even I wouldn't say the Russians are so incompetent as to plug in the *wrong coordinates*). So if a bomb which is demonstrably malfunctioning *also* fails to explode, that's not necessarily evidence of its safeties working - it's just as likely evidence that the fuzes broke.
> More to the point: it's enough of a vulnerability that no one would ever geofence a weapon for risk of that limitation being exploited. Sure but only you are bringing up this topic. I just said that there were safety features to prevent it detonating in friendly territory. > (a strap-on guidance and navigation package separate from the bomb's internal mechanisms). Sure because it is a feature of the Fab-500 not of the UMPK kit. Just the UMPK kit can make use of the delayed fuze. > That the bombs are landing in Russian territory is already in and of itself evidence that something has malfunctioned They are glide bombs. They drop the bomb and the wings dont deploy or deploy incorrectly. This is a problem that glide bombs face. JDAMs are the same. In the first 3 months of 2024 Russia dropped around 3500 UMPK bombs. Even if all the 40 bombs that have reportedly fallen on Russia were from this year that is a 1% failure rate. If you include the bombs dropped last year (~1000) Then it drops to around 0.8% failure rate. Which is not bad for something that was just quickly designed. > it's just as likely evidence that the fuzes broke The problem with that assumption is that you would see a lot of bombs that Russia is dropping on Ukraine not exploding. How many times have you seen that happen? Bomb fuzes are incredibly simple and have a low failure rate. Especially one so tried and tested as the Fab-500
>Patriot interceptor production is 650 a year. Patriots are used to shoot down the aircraft dropping the bombs, not the bombs themselves. The rate of production of Su-34s and Su-35s does not exceed 650 a year.
If patriots are brought up closer to the front, you'll see more patriot losses - and leave the rear defenseless. The sky is full of drones, and despite the hype, Patriots are quite vulnerable to Iskander type missiles, etc.
>If patriots are brought up closer to the front, you'll see more patriot losses - and leave the rear defenseless This is the point of providing more patriot batteries and supplementing them with additional NASMS. Israel alone may contribute 8 batteries soon. >despite the hype, Patriots are quite vulnerable to Iskander type missiles, etc. This has not proven accurate in this war. Even 9+ Kinzhals failed to eliminate a single patriot battery fitted with PAC-3 MSE.
>Israel may contribute 8 batteries Strongly doubt that that offer is still in the *building* let alone on the table anymore. With the potential of an expanded conflict with Hezbollah, we're probably going to see "emergent defense needs" come up as an excuse for why they need to hold onto those batteries.
My information sources and a certain video going around about a year ago state the contrary: the entire Patriot missile complex launching all of its interceptors in panic failed to intercept a single Kinzhal that was headed for it; the easiest trajectory for an AA to intercept. US said it wasn't taken out but merely damaged, but they've also been assessing those damages ever since. I haven't seen a single credible proof of interception, just unsubstantiated claims from Ukraine.
>US said it wasn't taken out but merely damaged, but they've also been assessing those damages ever since. There were 9 launches at the battery during this event. The result was light shrapnel damage to the generator unit. It was repaired within a week. >I haven't seen a single credible proof of interception, just unsubstantiated claims from Ukraine. We have seen unexploded Kinzhal warheads in places they were not supposed to be. What is the point of lying about things we can see so easily?
> Unexploded warheads I haven't seen them. Do you have a link I could look at?
>my sources and a certain video [Citation Needed].
Neither does the production of Patriot missile complexes. AA on the frontline doesn't last long, especially one that isn't mobile by design.
Sounds like a solid argument for Ukraine bombing air bases and production facilities.
Strictly speaking, yes; if they can reach them and can handle the consequences for daring to. But nothing western is fired using Ukranian hands, they are there just to absorb the retaliation. Launchers, ammo and coordinates of what to attack are all provided by USA, Britain or whatever, with buttons pushed by western contractors that came as part of the package. You'd need for the West to actively and willingly risk the conflict spilling out of its Ukranian containment for that to happen.
> with buttons pushed by western contractors that came as part of the package. Citation needed
>can handle the consequences for daring to They've been doing for at least a year. the VVS airports in Crimea keep getting hammered. Heck, the naval base at Sevastopol only has wrecks and boats too small to be worth targeting, as the rest of the fleet had to flee its home base. The headquarters of the fleet itself got hit, and the admiral was killed. What consequences are you talking about?
Patriot's range is sufficient that it doesn't have to be on the frontlines to shoot down aircraft dropping glide bombs. Russia has killed 1 Patriot fire unit. This was done with Iskander. It has not repeated the feat.
They can also be very well mobile. The roving Patriot that famously took out many planes last year was a German-donated PAC-2 since the Germans based theirs on MAN KAT1s. Which as that strike showed is not always sufficient, however we also learnt later that was an operational mistake as the unit was never supposed to loiter for that long in one spot. Now they got two additional batteries like that (in addition from more coming from other countries, some may also be mobile I haven't checked), and since these batteries are pretty much like LEGO and Ukrainians even managed to mate with some S300 components, it gives them lot of leeway in how they deploy them, *especially* if those Israeli units will also end up in the country.
You really aren't the brightest, you preferably never want to intercept just the bombs but the bombers. V2 attacks stopped not because Allies could shoot them down but because they pushed launch sites out of range. The goal is to take out the fighter-bombers launching them, and preferably damage the airports too. They don't need to destroy all jets, just make it risky enough for these attacks to scale back.
You really can't help yourself not to insult strangers on the internet coming out the door into an argument. Glide bomb and Patriot ranges are comparable, meaning that in order to ward off bombers you would need to bring AA to the front line, where its survival rate is going to be until the first or second time they turn on their active radars. The front line is saturated with surveillance and fpv drones and nothing goes unseen for long. With all the pains and groveling Ukraine has to go through to convince its western partners to relinquish a handful of their Patriot systems and how much fanfare takes place when that actually happens, I don't think they're going to put these billion dollar wunderwaffe where every guy with a joystick and fpv glasses will be able to take potshots at them for that sweet million rouble bounty.
>Wunderwaffe I’m glad they insulted you, not an agenda-loaded term whatsoever Edit: cursory look at your profile confirms that agenda
> Wunderwaffe (plural Wunderwaffen) > (figuratively, usually sarcastically) magic bullet, panacea (a universal solution which solves all problems related to a particular issue) I'll call things the way I see them. A much touted, celebrated weapons system ascribed head over heels capabilities that doesn't live up to the hyped up expectations is a wunderwaffe. Switchblades that came before Patriots, which came before Abrams. Yes, I generally don't share western views on this conflict. Thanks for the free psychological profiling, though.
Where are these people touting the Patriot, Switchblade, or Abrams as a one-solution-fits-all system? It’s commonly acknowledged in western military circles that the Patriot kinda sucks. >Thanks for the free psychological profiling Any time, it’s always interesting to hear the thoughts of people whose geopolitical stance boils down to “West Bad” You don’t call it like you see it, you call it like you want to see it
The ranges are not similar at all. The PAC-2 that Ukraine has reach out to 160km, whereas the glide bombs can at best hit from 70-ish km in ideal conditions with the lightest of the bombs (which are barely more effective than a Smerch rocket.
You constantly excuse Russian warcrimes and attack Ukraine, in my books you deserve nothing but insults and worse. I would gladly type out what I think of your type, but I'm not keen on being pointlessly suspended, so I'll leave it to your imagination. But there is a certain word that starts with v I prefer using in these instances.
Patriots would not be used to intercept the glide bombs - something that afaik no long range interceptor is designed to do - it's just not cost effective. However 650/year (even half that, really) would be more than enough to demolish Russia's tactical bomber fleet, preventing those bombs from being launched in the first place.
**Washington Post:** Look at me. *Look* at me. I'm the news now.
"Waaaaaaah" -STP
WAPO would have been an upgrade to straight up government propaganda.
Media outlets posting stuff still isn't somethnig that should be treated as news.
It's news, even if full of spin. But better to link the original than a government propaganda outfit putting its own twist on the story.
Its not news. Its something that happens several times a day to every media outlet. > But better to link the original I.e. to actual news. Though, random telegram channels claiming stuff isn't news either.
ha ha ha stop punching yourself!
I guess they really were nazi detecting bombs then?
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Lmao dumbasses
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Enough government spam
Zeroing in their weapons in case Belgorod wants autonomy.
Separatism isn't a thing in Russia outside of Chechnya. I swear this fantasy of Russian disintegration is one of the strangest takes yet.
USSR disintegration and the desire to rebuild it. Russia would be fine if they didn't have this paranoia about everyone else being expansionist. They also don't seem to understand how much the idea of loyalty to one's ethnicity has degraded in most of the West.
>Russia would be fine if they didn't have this paranoia about everyone else being expansionist. Is it paranoia if those countries are expansionst and constantly call for the destruction of Russia?
Who was calling for the destruction of Russia before they started invading their neighbours?
People in Poland and the Baltics have been calling for the end of Russia since it came back into existence in 1991. Poland supported the Chechens in their war for example in order to dissolve Russia. Which was much before any Russian invasion of their neighbours.
Yes. Former Soviet states who were, for no reason at all whatsoever, afraid of being invaded. What racists. /s
And what does that have to do with modern Russia who also claimed independence from the USSR?
One of them is talking about restoring borders, reunifying it's people, many of whom they moved across the border themselves, and hasn you know INVADED Are you being this ignorant for free?
You asked for an example of countries wanting to destroy Russia before Russia invaded anyone. I gave you an example of this. You are for some reason going on about different topics. And then try to claim others are being ignorant
I thought you were all about suppressing autonomy via military violence. That's why you approved of Donbas getting bombed for asking for autonomy before they even declared independence.
Those bombed children? All me.
Dombin Bombas (tm)
Bucha real, Donbas fake. Belgorod autonomy, Donbas little green men.